















This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regu-
late entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is
unable to control the behavior of rms once they are in the market.
We adapt the ClarkeGroves mechanism, characterize the optimal
mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social
surplusandexpectedtaxrevenue, andshowthatthesemechanisms
generally avoid budget decits and prevent excessive entry.
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11 Introduction
In recent years public policy has been engaged in redesigning markets
on a massive scale. In Eastern Europe, many formerly state owned en-
terprises were privatized after the breakdown of formerly communist
regimes, and further privatization programs are on the way. And in West-
ern economies, privatization and deregulation were launched in many
tightly regulated industries, ranging from public utilities to telecommu-
nications. These policies have by and large been successful in building
private markets and raising revenue. However, they have often failed
to pay sucient attention to the market structure implied by particular
privatization and deregulation schemes.
The recent allocation of government franchises for operating wireless
telecommunication through spectrum auctions is a case in point. These
auctions raised an enormous amount of revenue, which earned them high
praise both in the profession and the general public, but they may not
have created the best market structure.1
Usually an auction is said to be ecient if the objects are allocated
to the bidders who value them most. However, in the case of award-
ing spectrum rights, this principle does not apply without qualication.
For example, if bidders were allowed to get all spectrum rights, the win-
ner of the auction would typically monopolize the market. Awarding a
monopoly may raise the highest revenue for the auctioneer, but typically
at a loss in social welfare.
The recent spectrum auctions did not completely ignore market struc-
ture. Indeed, in the U.S. the market was broken down into many regional
submarkets which, in the case of mobile phone services, had to be sup-
plied by two providers, and various armative action schemes were em-
ployed to give preferential treatment to minority operated rms. How-
ever, in other countries, nationwide spectrum rights were sometimes auc-
tioned strictly to the highest bidder. For example, in Germany the reg-
ulator recently auctioned ten twinpaired radio frequencies for mobile
telecommunications in the 1800 MHz range in this way. All four existing
providers did participate in the auction, but in the end all frequencies
were awarded to the two major providers (see Cane (1999)): Mannes-
1Market structure is, of course, also a concern in private industry. A case in point
is the relationship between the Holland Sweetener Company that challenged the mo-
nopolistic position of Monsanto, the producer of NutraSweet, and the major buyers
of such sweeteners such as Coke and Pepsi. The latter wished to continue buying
NutraSweet, but also had a vested interest to keep the new competitor alive and well
in order to restrain Monsanto's monopoly.
2mann Mobilfunk, who won the larger share, and DeTeMobil (Deutsche
Telekom).
If the concern for market structure is taken serious at all by public
policy, it is usually accounted for by imposing restrictions on the (min-
imum) number of suppliers who must serve the market. However, the
issue is usually complicated by the fact that the regulator has incomplete
information about relevant market characteristics, and cannot know how
many rms should serve a particular market unless rms reveal their
individual characteristics. Therefore, the design of franchising or priva-
tization schemes usually cannot be separated from the design of mech-
anisms that detect and implement the right market structure.
The purpose of the present paper is to design optimal mechanisms to
implement the optimal market structure under conditions of incomplete
information, when the regulator cannot know which and how many rms
should participate in the market, unless he induces rms to reveal their
relevant private information. In particular, we
. characterize the optimal Groves mechanism that yields the highest
tax revenue in the class of mechanisms that implement eciency;
. solve the optimal mechanism that maximizes a weighted sum of
tax revenue and social surplus, which is relevant if general taxation
is subject to a deadweight loss;
. show that free entry would lead to ineciency;
. show that optimal mechanisms are generally decit free.
Thereisasmallliteratureonthedesignofmarketstructure, especially
in the context of procurement. This literature usually analyzes particular
mechanisms but does not consider optimal mechanisms. To our knowl-
edge there are three exceptions: Dana and Spier (1994), McGuire and
Riordan (1995), and Auriol and Laont (1992). However, all three pa-
pers restrict the analysis to two potential suppliers so that the choice is
between duopoly and monopoly.
Dana and Spier (1994) analyze the optimal market structure when tax
revenue and eciency matter. Their model is the most closely related to
our paper, since they also assume that rms are not regulated once they
are in the market. Similarly, McGuire and Riordan (1995) analyze the
market structure in the particular context of two rms that produce dif-
ferentiated products. The main dierence between these and our paper
is that we do not restrict the number of rms to just two rms.
3In turn, Auriol and Laont (1992) consider a framework where rms
are regulated once they are in the market. Firms' marginal costs are pri-
vate information whereas xed costs are common knowledge. They show
that monopoly is favored if market structure is chosen after marginal
costs have been revealed, whereas the government prefers duopoly if
the market structure is chosen ex ante. In contrast to their model, we as-
sume that the government cannot or does not wish to regulate rms once
they are in the market. Moreover, in our model, xed costs are private
information, which is plausible when rms' marginal costs are relatively
insignicant, as in the telecommunications industry.
An important question is whether optimal mechanisms are decit
free. Interestingly, this question bears some relationship to the literature
concerning excessive entry in oligopoly markets (see Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986) and Suzumura (1995)). As it turns out, optimal mechanisms
are decit free if and only if excessive entry occurs in a hypothetical free
entry game. Adapting a wellknown excessive entry result by Mankiw
and Whinston, we conclude that optimal mechanisms are decit free if
the integer constraint on the number of rms does not bind.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 explains some basic properties of feasible direct revelation
mechanisms that are crucial for the design of optimal mechanisms. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the implementation of ecient market structure in dom-
inant strategies and characterizes the tax revenue maximizing Groves
mechanism. Section 5 solves the optimal mechanism when tax revenue
matters more than social surplus, due to the deadweight loss of gen-
eral taxation. Section 6 shows why free entry cannot generally imple-
ment the ecient market structure, which explains why entry regulation
is desirable in natural oligopoly, and Section 7 shows that the optimal
mechanism is generally decit free. The paper closes in Section 8 with a
discussion.
2 The model
Consider a natural oligopoly market with a large number of potential
rms. All rms have the same variable costs, but dierent xed costs.
The regulator has decided to award a limited number of unrestricted li-
censes to operate in this market. The regulator's problem is to determine
the optimal number of licenses to be issued if eciency or tax revenue
matters, and to assign them to particular rms. This problem is compli-
cated by the fact that xed costs are rms' private information.
4After licenses have been awarded, the licensees play some market
game that gives rise to identical equilibrium prots  (before deducting
xed costs) and aggregate consumer surplus C, that are a function of
the number of licenses n. These reduced form payo functions have the
following properties.
Assumption 1 Aggregate producer surplus n : nn is decreas-
ing: n  1<n; aggregate consumer surplus is increasing: Cn
1 > Cn; and aggregate social surplus Sn : n  Cn is increas-
ing: Sn  1>S  n  , but at a decreasing rate: Sn > Sn  1;
Sn : Sn − Sn − 1. No payos are generated if no licenses are
issued: 0  C0  0.
From the regulator's perspective, rms' privately known xed costs
are independent random variables ^  : ^ 1;:::;^ N), drawn from a distri-
bution Gx1;:::;x N 
QN
i1 Gkxk, with support  :
QN
i1i;  i, and
with positive densities gkxk : G
0
kxk.
A market game that gives rise to the properties stated in Assump-
tion 1 is the standard Cournot game, provided that game has a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies. In the present framework, a frequently
employed sucient condition for existence and uniqueness is (see Sel-
ten (1970) and Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977))2
Assumption 2 Market demand PQ has a nite satiation point  Q, i.e.
PQ  0;8Q   Q, is twice continuously dierentiable with PQ > 0,
and P0Q < 0, 8Q 2 0;  Q, and satises the condition: P00QQi 
P0Q < 0, 8qi > 0;Q2 0;  Q.
Finally, we assume:
Assumption 3 The least cost monopoly prot is nonnegative, which re-
quires 1  minf 1;:::; Ng, and maxf1;:::;NgSN, which
implies that each conceivable market size can be ecient.
3 Basic properties of feasible mechanisms
We begin with some basic properties of feasible regulatory mechanisms.
By the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979)) attention can be restricted
2Of course, the market game may dier from the Cournot game; however, without
specifying the game one cannot know which assumptions are required for uniqueness
of the solution of that game.
5to direct revelation mechanisms, where the regulator asks rms to inde-
pendently announce their xed costs, and then determines who gets a
license and how much each rm has to pay.
Direct revelation mechanisms are described by two outcome func-
tions p;t of the form p : N ! 0;1N and t : N ! RN. For each
vector of announced xed costs  2 N, the allocation rule pk is the
probability that rm k gets a license, and the payment rule tk is rm
k's payment to the regulator. Note, a rm may have to pay something
even if it is not awarded a license.
We denote by np :
P
pk the number of rms that obtain a
license if the mechanism p;t is used, and dene the expected payment,
probability of being in the market and prot in this case of rm k when
it announces xed costs k as










 kk : E^ −k
h
npk; ^ −kpkk; ^ −k
i
; (3)
Expectation is taken over the xed costs ^ −k of all rms except k. Note
that   does not depend on the payment rule t. Moreover, let
Ukk j k :  kk − k pkk −  tkk (4)
denote the expected payo of rm k if it announces k while its true
xed cost is k. Finally, we dene
 Ukk : Ukk j k: (5)
Using this notation, a direct revelation mechanism p;t is incentive
compatible if  Ukk  Ukk; k, for all k and k, it satises the in-
terim participation constraint if  Ukk  0, for all k and k, and it is
called feasible if it is both incentive compatible and satises the interim
participation constraint.
Theorem 1 (RevenueEquivalence) A feasible direct revelation mech-
anism p;t gives rise to the following payos  Ukk and expected tax
6revenue T:


















−  Uk k

: (8)
In particular, all such mechanisms that have the same allocation rule p
and reservation utilities  Uk k also give rise to the same payos and
expected tax revenue.
Proof In a feasible direct revelation mechanism truthtelling is a best














kk − pkk: (9)
Integration gives (6), and hence  Ukk  0i  Uk k  0, for all k,b y
the monotonicity property (9). Using  Ukk   k−k− tkk gives
 tkk, and (8) follows from the fact that T 
P
E tk^ k. Since  k does
not depend on t, we conclude that, for a given allocation rule, all feasible
direct revelation mechanisms give rise to the same payos and expected
tax revenues, unless rms' reservation utilities dier. 
4 The optimal Groves mechanism
The ecient market structure which maximizes social welfare can be
implemented in dominant strategies by a Groves mechanism. In this
section we characterize the ecient market structure and derive that
particular Groves mechanism which maximizes the expected tax revenue
3  Uk is piecewise continuously dierentiable if the density g is smooth. If dieren-
tiability is not satised, the proof is a bit more elaborate along the lines of the proof
of Myerson (1981).
7in the class of Bayesian mechanisms that implement the ecient market
structure.
Note that implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies is
a much weaker requirement than implementation in dominant strate-
gies. It may be somewhat surprising that a simple dominant strategy
mechanism maximizes tax revenue in the larger class of mechanisms
that implement the ecient allocation as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.4
















Call an allocation rule monotone if it assigns entry rights only to the rms
with the lowest xed cost, i.e. if pk  1 and l < k implies pl  1.
Clearly, the ecient rule must be monotone.























where f denotes the order statistic of . It remains to determine the








From this representation, we conclude that the jth best rm should





k : fk  Sk
	
(10)







1i f k  S n?
0 else:
(11)
Note that np?  n?.
As is wellknown, it is possible to implement the ecient allocation
rule in dominant strategies. The revenue maximizing mechanism in this
class of mechanisms is characterized as follows.
4On the optimality of the ClarkeGroves mechanism in several other applications
see Krishna and Perry (1998) and Schweizer (1999).
8Theorem 2 (Optimal Groves Mechanism) The mechanism p?;t?















is a Groves mechanism.5 Moreover, it is the mechanism that maximizes
tax revenue among all feasible mechanisms which implement the ecient
market structure p?.
Proof A Groves mechanism which implements p? has payments of the
form





















be the social welfare which is generated if rm k has the highest xed
cost k   k. We now show that
t
?











j   C n
?
i
can be simplied to (12).
If p
?
k  0, then also p? k; −k  0. Thus, we have Wp?; 
Wp?; k; −k; and it follows that t
?
k   0. If p
?
k  1, we distin-
guish the following cases:
1)  k  min
n
 k;S n?;f n?1
o
:
Then rm k stays in the market with xed costs  k. Thus, p? k; −k 

















k    n
? −  k :
2) fn?1  min
n
 k;S n?;f n?1
o
:
5Recall that f is the order statistic of .
9In this case, the rm with xed costs fn?1 replaces rm k. Therefore,
n? k; −k  n?, p? k; −k 6 p?, and p
?
i  k; −k  1 for the

















k    n
? − fn?1 :
3) S n?  min
n
 k;S n?;f n?1
o
:
Here, rm k drops out of the market and no other rm takes its place.
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 − j
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? − C n
?
  n
? − S n
?:
We now show that the expected utility of rm k is zero in the worst
case, when its xed cost is equal to  k. In this event it can only make
a prot if it is in the market, that is if  k  Sn? k; −k. But
this entails  k  fn?1 by denition of p?. Thus, rm k has to pay
n? k; −k −  k in this case, which is exactly equal to its prot so
that  Uk k  0.
As we know from the RevenueEquivalence Theorem, in each feasible
mechanism that implements p? the regulator is only free to choose rms'
reservation utilities  Uk k. In view of the participation constraint, it is
therefore optimal to set all of them equal to zero. This is exactly what
the mechanism p?;t? does. 
105 Optimal mechanisms if tax revenue matters
The government may care more for tax revenue than for consumer and
producer surplus because the marginal cost of raising other taxes to fund
government expenditures is greater than one, due to welfare distortions
associated with general taxation. This suggests that the regulator maxi-
mizes a convex combination of expected tax revenue and social surplus:
T1−EW, or equivalently−1TEW, where  : 1=1−  1
represents the marginal cost of general taxation.6 Generally, a preference
for tax revenue, >1, makes it optimal to deviate from the allocation
rule that maximizes social welfare.
To prepare the thus generalized optimal mechanism design problem
we introduce the denitions of virtual social surplus:
Sn : Sn − Cn; (13)
and priority levels (that name will become clear later on):




Furthermore, we let   1;:::; N be the order statistic of γ, where 1
denotes the lowest and N the highest priority level.
In addition, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4 Priority levels γkk are strict monotone increasing for all
k 2f 1;:::;Ng. A sucient condition is that hazard rates gkk=Gkk
are strict monotone decreasing.
Assumption 4 considerably simplies the characterization of the op-
timal mechanism since it assures that the secondorder condition of the
incentive compatibility constraint is satised. However, it can be dis-
pensed with by employing a convexication argument developed in My-
erson (1981) and Baron and Myerson (1982).7
Lemma 1 The following mechanism p;t maximizes the convex combi-
nation of expected tax revenue and social welfare, L : T 1−EW
6This objective function is frequently used in public economics, see for example
Laont and Tirole (1993) and Dana and Spier (1994).
7For a more accessible account of this procedure see also Landsberger and
Tsirelson (1999)).




















n : maxfk : k  Skg: (17)
Proof The expected tax revenue of feasible direct revelation mecha-
nisms has already been determined in (8). A necessary condition for the
maximum of T is  Uk k  0, for all k. Therefore, the regulator's objec-




























































 1 − Cnp^ 

g^ d^ :












 1 − Cnp^ :
12Obviously we want the rms with the lowest priority levels to enter the
market. We can therefore restrict attention to allocation rules p which











Thus, the regulator has to determine the size np which maximizes the








Snp − k ;
the optimal number of rms in the market is given by
n : maxfk : k  Skg:
Thus, the allocation rule p which maximizes the dierence between vir-
tual social surplus and the sum of priority levels satises
p

k  1i fγkk  Sn;
and p

k  0 otherwise.
It remains to show that p;t is a feasible mechanism. Expected







Thus, the interim participation constraint is satised. By Assumption
4, the probability  p

k of being in the market is decreasing in k. This is
equivalent to incentive compatibility. 
From this result we can now derive a simple and intuitively appealing
characterization of the optimal mechanism. For this purpose suppose
xed costs have been revealed to the regulator and consider a rm k that
qualies to be awarded a license, because its priority level is suciently
low, according to the allocation rule (15). Then, the regulator can com-
pute the supremum of xed cost that this rm k could have had, given





x 2 k;  k : γkx  minfn1;Sng
o
:
This supremum of winning xed costs plays a key role in the construc-
tion of the optimal payment rule, as follows.
13Theorem 3 (Optimality if Tax Revenue Matters) The optimal mech-
anism issues a license to the n rms with the lowest priority levels.
Payments are collected only from those rms that obtain a license, who
then pay a transfer equal to the net prot they would have earned if they
had the supremum of winning xed costs:
tk  n − y

k−k: (19)
Proof Employing the denition of y

k−k, the optimal allocation rule









































Corollary 1 If the optimal mechanism is adopted, the expected number
of licensed rms, n, is decreasing in . For   0 we are back at imple-
menting the welfare optimum, and for   1, i.e. if tax revenue is the only
thing that matters, the optimal mechanism implements monopoly.
If rms' xed costs are i.i.d. random variables, only the least cost
rms get a license. However, if the ^ 's dier, it is generally optimal to
discriminate between rms, as follows.
Theorem 4 Suppose hazard rates are monotone across rms. Then, the
optimal mechanism exhibits handicapping of rms whose xed costs are
drawn from the more favorable distribution.
14Proof Consider two rms, say rm 1 and rm 2, and assume rm 1












y g2x=G2xdx, which implies
lnG1y  lnG2y, and hence G1y  G2y. In other words, ^ 1
dominates ^ 2 in the sense of rstorder stochastic dominance. Since
lower xed costs are more favorable, we conclude that ^ 1 is the more
favorable random variable than ^ 2. Using the denition of priority
levels we conclude:
8x : γ1x : x  
G2
g2




Therefore, the allocation of licenses to the rms with the lowest priority
levels, as advised by the optimal mechanism, handicaps those rms who
draw their xed cost from the more favorable distributions. 
We close with some examples to illustrate the gains from such dis-







. This yields priority levels
γii  i  i − i:
The markup of a rm's xed costs is proportional to the extent it exceeds
its minimal cost i. In this sense, the optimal mechanism discriminates
against good rms which increases their payments in case they win a
license.
Now let N  2 and   1 (only tax revenue matters). Moreover, let ^ 1
be uniformly distributed on 0;1 and ^ 2 uniformly distributed on 1;2,
so that ^ 1 is unambiguously the more favorably distributed random vari-
able than ^ 2. Priority levels are
γ11  21;γ 22  22 − 1: (21)
And the tax revenue maximizing mechanism summarized in Theorem 3
deviates from the ecient selection of one rm by picking the inferior
rm 2 whenever 2 < 1  0:5:
In order to gain some intuition why it is optimal to add a distortion in
this manner, consider the impact of a distortion of eciency on tax rev-
enue that is due to awarding the license to the inferior rm 2 whenever
152 < 1  , for >0. As one can easily conrm, if one starts from the
ecient selection of one rm and raises  just marginally, tax revenue
jumps up in the event when rm 1 wins the license, which occurs al-
most with certainty, and declines when rm 2 wins (which almost never
occurs).8 Therefore, adding a small distortion, >0, unambiguously
increases tax revenue.
In particular, tax revenue can be expressed as function R of the dis-
tortion parameter , as follows:
R 1 −















43 − 32  6
6
:
It follows immediately that the tax revenue maximizing distortion is to
set   0:5 (and the expected tax revenue is thus raised from 1−1t o
1−23=24), which is precisely the optimal mechanism summarized in
Theorem 3 for   1.
6 Free entry and ineciency
A natural question is whether a mechanism is needed in the rst place.
Why not let free entry implement the ecient market size? Another
important issue is whether the optimal mechanism, if it is adopted, con-
tributes to a budget decit. Ideally, the optimal mechanism should also
be decit free. As we show in this and the subsequent section, both is-
sues are somewhat interrelated. In particular, free entry generally leads
to an inecient market size, and the optimal mechanism is generally
decit free.
To explain market size under free entry, consider a twostage market
game. After having observed their own xed costs, rms simultaneously
decide whether to enter into the market, and then, after entry decisions
have been observed, play a Cournotstyle market game. For simplicity,
8If rm 1 wins, one has either 2 > 1  , in which case tax revenue is equal to
1 − 1, or 2 < 1   and 1 2 0; 2 − , in which case tax revenue is equal
to 1 − 2 − . Therefore, if rm 1 wins, tax revenue is always higher than in
the ecient mechanism (where it is equal to 1 − 1). However, if rm 2 wins, tax
revenue is equal to 1 − 1  , which is evidently lower than 1 − 1.
16xed costs are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with the continuous
probability distribution function G : 0;   ! 0;1, and  >  N  .9
In the Bayesian equilibrium of this game, rms enter the market i
their xed costs are below some threshold level c 2 0;  , which is










m 1 − Gc
N−1−m − c  0: (22)
Thereby, the left-hand side is the equilibrium expected prot of the bor-
derline rm with xed cost equal to c if it enters, given that only the
rms with xed costs at or below c do enter.10
Theorem 5 Free entry generally gives rise to an inecient market size.
Proof The equilibrium market size under free entry is equal to the ef-




The free entry equilibrium denes a deterministic threshold level c, im-
plicitly dened in (22), whereas the ecient number of rms, n, and
therefore Sn? is random, because it depends on the realization of
xed costs. Consequently, free entry generally fails to implement the
ecient market size. 
7 Is the optimal mechanism decit free?
We now show that the optimal mechanism is generally decit free by us-
ing an excessive entry property of a hypothetical entry game. We proceed
as follows: First, we introduce the hypothetical entry game and explain
why it exhibits excessive entry. Second, we consider the optimal Groves
mechanism analyzed in Section 4, which maximizes tax revenue in the
class of mechanisms that implement the ecient market size. We show
that this mechanism is decit free. Third, we conclude that the optimal
mechanism which maximizes the weighted sum of expected tax revenue
and social surplus is also decit free.
9If    Nall rms would enter the market and no one would suer a loss.
10For a proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium threshold level c see
Dixit and Shapiro (1986).
17At the outset notice that the regulator would subsidize a rm that
earns a negative prot in order to induce it to participate in the market
game if this raises the social surplus by more than this rm's losses.
Therefore, it is not obvious that the optimal mechanism should be decit
free.
Consider a hypothetical entry game which serves exclusively as a
benchmark for our analysis. In this hypothetical game rms' xed costs
are common knowledge, and all least cost rms enter until the marginal
rm earns zero prots and then play a Cournotstyle market game. Inte-
ger constraints on the number of rms are ignored. This game gives rise
to excessive entry, analogous to the wellknown excessive entry property
of symmetric Cournot market games discovered by Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986).
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium of the hypothetical entry game, the number
of entrants, ne, is greater than or equal to the welfare maximizing
number of entrants, n0, for all .
Proof Ignoring integer constraints let fn be a continuously dier-
entiable function that denotes the nth highest xed costs, qn each
rm's equilibrium output, and Pnqn the inverse market demand.
Then, the social welfare generated by the nrm hypothetical entry cum








and ne is implicitly determined by the zeroprot condition:
n
e − fn
e  0: (24)
Dierentiating (23) with respect to n yields, at n  ne:
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Hence, welfare can be increased by lowering n below ne. 
18Theorem 6 If integer constraints on the number of rms do not bind, the
optimal mechanism is decit free.
Proof The assertion follows easily for the optimal Groves mechanism
that implements the ecient market size n0. Indeed, by denition of
n0 and ne, combined with the excessive entry property ne  n0
















Therefore, the regulator receives a nonnegative transfer from each rm
that is awarded a license (others neither pay nor receive anything) equal
to




Hence, the optimal Groves mechanism is decit free.
Compared to the optimal Groves mechanism, which maximizes tax
revenue in the class of mechanisms that implement the ecient market
size, the optimal mechanism, analyzed in Section 5, gives more weight to
tax revenue. Therefore, it yields at least as much tax revenue, and hence
is also decit free. 
Of course, it is not satisfactory to ignore the integer constraint on
the number of rms, as we did so far, in this section. Indeed, if one
takes this constraint into account, one can easily nd examples, where
the hypothetical entry game gives rise to insucient entry. However, as
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have shown, ne  n − 1, so that entry is
never insucient by more than one rm. Also, Perry (1984) performed
numerical simulations assuming constant elasticity of demand curves
and Cournot equilibrium, and showed that the integer constraint tends
to matter only if the number of rms in the entry equilibrium tends to
be in the order of one or two rms.
In addition, we report the following necessary and sucient condition
for the optimal mechanism to be decit free, that does not ignore the
integer constraint.
19Theorem 7 Taking the integer constraint into account, the optimal mech-
anism is always decit free if and only if for all n  2
Sn  n: (26)
Proof Again, we rst look at the ecient mechanism and then extend
the result to the optimal mechanism.
Condition (26) entails minf k;S n?;f n?1gn. This
assures that the ecient mechanism does not subsidize any rm, which
proves suciency.
It remains to be shown that (26) is also a necessary condition. For this
purpose, suppose, per absurdum, that (26) is violated so that n <
Sn for some n. Now consider the event that  n <f n < Sn, for
all i  1;:::;n. Then, the ecient mechanism selects these n rms to
participate in the market. Since participation is voluntary, this requires
that they are subsidized. And the subsidy per active rm i is at least as
high as
fi − n > 0; 8i  1;:::;n:
Therefore, the ecient mechanism gives rise to a decit.
The optimal mechanism gives more weight to tax revenue than the
ecient mechanism. Therefore, the above condition also assures that
the optimal mechanism is decit free. 
8 Discussion
In the present paper we have analyzed the regulation of entry in a nat-
ural oligopoly market, in the tradition of the optimal mechanism design
approach. The two key assumptions were that rms have private infor-
mation about their xed costs and that the regulator is unable to control
the behavior of rms once they are in the market.
We addressed four issues: 1) the design of the optimal Groves mecha-
nism that yields the highest tax revenue in the class of mechanisms that
implement eciency; 2) the design of the optimal mechanism that maxi-
mizes a weighted sum of tax revenue and social surplus, which is relevant
if general taxation is subject to a deadweight loss; 3) a comparison of the
optimal mechanism with the free entry market equilibrium, and 4) an
assessment of the budgetary consequences of the optimal mechanism.
There are two main limitations of the present analysis. First, our
analysis is restricted to an independent private values framework, where
20rms' xed costs are independent random variables. In a framework
of stochastic dependency, one would probably need other mechanisms,
that supply rms with more information about each other, just like in an
open ascending auction. The second major limitation has to do with the
assumption that all potential rms have the same marginal cost, and dif-
fer only in their xed costs. Ideally one would like to assume that rms
have dierent xed and marginal costs which is rms' private informa-
tion. However, this gives rise to multidimensional mechanism design
problems that are still not resolved with sucient generality.
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